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FIXING IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS IN THE FOUNDING ERA
The Second Creation: Fixing the American Constitution in
the Founding Era. By Jonathan Gienapp.1 Harvard
University Press. 2018. Pp. 451. $35.00 (Cloth).
John Mikhail2
Jonathan Gienapp’s new book, The Second Creation, is a
marvelous study of the earliest debates over constitutional
language, meaning, and interpretation. In virtually every respect,
the book is brilliantly conceived, meticulously researched, and
masterfully executed. Like any worthwhile scholarly endeavor, it
will generate fresh insights and open up new avenues of inquiry,
some of which may eventually call into question some of
Gienapp’s own premises and arguments. In the current academic
and political climate, the implicit challenge this exciting
monograph poses to originalism also seems likely to provoke a
certain amount of healthy controversy.
The Second Creation is written for multiple audiences. On the
one hand, the book is addressed to historians, political scientists,
and other specialists in early American politics, offering them a
dramatic new account of the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution, along with four early constitutional controversies:
removal, amendments, the bank, and the Jay Treaty. As his title
implies, however, Gienapp also defends a provocative thesis of
import for constitutional lawyers and, in particular, constitutional

1. Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University.
2. Associate Dean for Research and Academic Programs and Agnes N. Williams
Research Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. The author wishes to thank
Mary Bilder, Brian Bix, William Ewald, Jonathan Gienapp, Maeva Marcus, Victoria
Nourse, Farah Peterson, Robert Reinstein, David Schwartz, Lawrence Solum, and William
Treanor for their feedback. A previous version of this essay appeared in an online
symposium on The Second Creation. See John Mikhail, Fixing the Constitution’s Implied
Powers, BALKINIZATION (October 25, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/fixingconstitutions-implied-powers.html.

507

06 MIKHAIL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

508

12/23/2019 11:03 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:507

originalists. In a nutshell, that thesis is that constitutional meaning
was not fixed when the Constitution was framed and ratified. Nor
did it operate as a significant constraint on early practice. The
“Fixation Thesis” and “Constraint Principle” endorsed by many
contemporary originalists,3 therefore, are untenable insofar as
they endeavor to be faithful to the best historical understanding
of the founding era—or so Gienapp seems to suggest. A close
encounter with that history reveals that constitutional meaning
was uncertain, unstable, and “up for grabs” right from the start.
In no small part, this was due to a pervasive uncertainty over what
kind of instrument or object the Constitution itself actually was.
For example, the Constitution is written, yes; but is it entirely
so? Is it a contract, power of attorney, corporate charter,
something else?4 To what extent does it presuppose or
incorporate principles of common law or the law of nations? And
what is the significance of its most noteworthy omissions? The
Articles of Confederation contains a crucial provision reserving
to the states all powers not “expressly delegated” to the United
States, but the Constitution does not.5 Does the Constitution
nonetheless presume that whatever is not given is reserved? Does
it presume that whatever is not expressly given is reserved? What
about the document’s very first and most striking sentence—the
Preamble? Does it fall within the scope of the Constitution?
Finally, what should one make of the fact that some of the
state ratifying conventions adopted the Constitution with a “form
of ratification” or other interpretive declaration, explaining how
the document should be construed? When the South Carolina
convention adopted the Constitution, for example, it echoed the
Articles of Confederation by declaring that “no Section or
paragraph of the said Constitution warrants a Construction that
the states do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by

3. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269
(2017); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453 (2013).
4. On the second and third alternatives, see GARY LAWSON AND GUY SEIDMAN,
“A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION
(2017); see also John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate
Charter? A Commentary on “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary
Constitution by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 407 (2019).
5. See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
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them and vested in the General Government of the Union.”6
Likewise, when the Virginia convention ratified the Constitution,
it did so with the stipulation—prepared by a five-member
committee that included James Madison, Edmund Randolph, and
John Marshall—that “no right of any denomination can be
canceled, abridged, restrained, or modified by the Congress . . . by
the President or any Department or Officer of the United States
except in those instances in which power is given by the
Constitution for those purposes.”7 As Randolph proposed to the
Virginia convention a few days earlier, the purpose of this
stipulation was to enable Virginians to consider “every exercise of
a power not expressly delegated”8 by the Constitution to be a
violation of that instrument. Should these eighteenth-century
counterparts to modern-day “signing statements” be considered
part of the Constitution, or at least part of an essential
compromise that enabled it to be adopted? Why or why not?
As those who have spent ample time with the documentary
record know, all of these problems, and others like them,
permeate the earliest debates over the Constitution. Unlike
narrower semantic questions (the meaning of “commerce” or
“emolument,” for example),9 none of them can be easily reduced
to, or replaced by, empirical questions about the original public
meaning of the constitutional text. Rather, these problems take us
beyond the text to a challenging interpretive terrain that many
conventional forms of originalism or “constitutional textualism”10
do not comfortably reach. The historical and linguistic inferences
one draws on this shaky ground are not only underdetermined,
but deeply and pervasively so, in part because the available
records are so fragmentary, equivocal, and inconclusive.
6. Amendments Proposed by the South Carolina Convention (May 23, 1788),
reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 15 (1991) (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, & Charlene
Bangs Bickford, eds., 1991).
7. The Virginia Form of Ratification, 26 June, reprinted in 12 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1546 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993).
8. 12 id. at 1455-56 (Speech of Edmund Randolph, June 21).
9. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); John Mikhail, The 2018 Seegers Lecture: Emoluments and
President Trump, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 631 (2019).
10. See Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1297, 1306 (observing that at his confirmation hearing, Justice Brett Kavanaugh used the
term “constitutional textualism” to summarize his commitment to public-meaning
originalism).
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Moreover, even when the historical evidence is reasonably clear,
it often suggests the founders may have simply disagreed with one
another over the particular constitutional provision or principle at
issue.
For all of these reasons, I am inclined to agree with the main
thrust of The Second Creation. Gienapp’s key insight seems
correct: in fundamental respects, the American Constitution was
obscure, unfinished, and uncertain in 1789, and we can learn a
great deal about its multiple alternative meanings by paying closer
attention to how constitutional debates actually unfolded in the
first years after its adoption. Nonetheless, I want to challenge
Gienapp’s thesis to some extent by examining the part of his
narrative with which I am most familiar—the earliest
congressional debates over implied powers—and by offering a
somewhat different interpretation of these events than he does,
which focuses less on issues involving language, meaning, and
ontology, and more on the complex interplay of economic
interests, regional alignments, and political power. Despite my
admiration for The Second Creation, at the end of the day I think
Gienapp may overstate the importance of the former issues and
unduly neglect the latter, even if one accepts the particular
methodology and linguistic focus he outlines in the book’s
Introduction (pp. 15-18). By setting aside the dizzying swirl of
semantics for a moment, and looking with a practical eye at how
members of Congress actually voted in these controversies, one
can identify some remarkably consistent through lines that render
the entire sequence of events, and the talking points of politicians,
less inchoate and more intelligible. As with so much else that
occurred at the time, two unifying themes are land and slavery.
A useful starting point is the constitutional convention itself,
which Gienapp discusses in Chapter One of The Second Creation
(pp. 57-74). As I read the historical record, after the Great
Compromise was achieved at the convention on July 16, by means
of which the states were assured equal strength in the Senate,
while voting power in the House was based on population
(modified by the three-fifths clause), the actual drafting of the
Constitution was a process disproportionately controlled by, and
most congenial to, a core group of nationalist delegates from
Pennsylvania and three other “landless” Mid-Atlantic states—
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey—along with a handful of
like-minded delegates from the other states. It is easy to overlook
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the fact that over half of the framers who signed the Constitution
(20 of 39) represented one of these four Mid-Atlantic states. In
fact, just two of these states—Pennsylvania (with eight delegates)
and Delaware (with five)—contributed a full third (13/39) of these
signatures. Pennsylvania also supplied the two principal authors
of the Constitution, James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, who
did the lion’s share of the actual drafting of the document on
behalf of the Committees of Detail and of Style, respectively.
Between them, Wilson and Morris were primarily
responsible for the precise language of three of the four
“dangerous clauses” that Gienapp highlights in Chapter Two (pp.
87-95): the Preamble, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
jurisdictional grant in Article III extending the judicial power of
the United States “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution . . . .”11 The fourth of these clauses, the General
Welfare Clause, was added to the Constitution by the Committee
on Postponed Parts, chaired by another Mid-Atlantic delegate,
David Brearly of New Jersey. Although we lack detailed records
of this committee’s treatment of the General Welfare Clause,
there are strong reasons to believe it received the support of
Brearly and the other Mid-Atlantic delegates, including Morris
(Pennsylvania), John Dickinson (Delaware), and Daniel Carroll
(Maryland), along with the three New England delegates:
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire), Rufus King (Massachusetts),
and Roger Sherman (Connecticut). By contrast, support for the
General Welfare Clause from the four remaining members of this
committee—James Madison (Virginia), Hugh Williamson (North
Carolina), Pierce Butler (South Carolina), and Abraham Baldwin
(Georgia)—seems less certain.
For the Mid-Atlantic states, at least, the “dangerous clauses”
were not dangerous at all, but precisely what they had long
wanted in a new charter of government.12 As Merrill Jensen

11. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
12. The same is true of another formidable clause to which Gienapp devotes less
attention: the Supremacy Clause. Although it is easy to overlook this, the genesis of this
clause was also principally a Mid-Atlantic affair. The clause was first proposed by William
Paterson on June 15 as part of the New Jersey Plan. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 245 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). After the Great Compromise was
reached, Maryland’s Luther Martin revived Paterson’s proposal on July 17, which was then
adopted unanimously. See 2 id. at 28-29. Thereafter, Wilson and Morris took the lead in
framing the clause and strengthening its language for their respective committees. See 2 id.
at 169, 183, 603.
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emphasized over eighty years ago, the critical point to recognize
about these Mid-Atlantic states is that their principal land
speculators, merchants, and businessmen were situated very
differently than their counterparts in Virginia, North Carolina,
and other “landed” states in the competition for profitable
investments in western lands.13 As a result, these individuals were
a driving force during the formative years of the United States to
recognize implied powers in Congress that could be invoked to
assert jurisdiction over these territories. Many of the delegates to
the constitutional convention from these Mid-Atlantic states, in
fact, had direct or indirect ties to these earlier campaigns to
extend the scope of congressional authority, as did many of their
most prominent constituents.14 Many of these Mid-Atlantic
delegates were also closely affiliated with the Bank of North
America, another venture which relied on implied national
powers.15
In light of this background and the disproportionate control
they exerted in Philadelphia, it is not surprising that the MidAtlantic states were quite happy with the Constitution, including
its nationalism and sweeping implied powers. Three of these four
states—Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey—were among
the first states to ratify the Constitution, and two of them—
Delaware (30-0) and New Jersey (38-0)—did so unanimously.16
13. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 27 (1936); Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784, 26 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 323 (1939). See also MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781 (1940).
14. A partial list of Mid-Atlantic delegates who were affiliated with the two most
important land companies, the Indiana and Illinois-Wabash Companies, with claims to
these territories, includes Thomas Fitzsimons, Benjamin Franklin, Daniel of St. Thomas
Jenifer, Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, and James Wilson. See JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 13, at 121-22, 211-12; John Mikhail, James
Wilson, Early American Land Companies, and the Original Meaning of “Ex Post Facto
Law,” 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 91-93 (2019).
15. The Mid-Atlantic delegates affiliated with the Bank of North America included
Richard Bassett, George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, Benjamin Franklin, Jared Ingersoll,
Thomas Mifflin, Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, George Read, and James Wilson. See
LAWRENCE LEWIS, A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 68, 133-147 (1882);
John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045, 1078-80 (2014).
Another delegate who owned shares in the bank was John Langdon of New Hampshire.
See LEWIS, supra, at 134, 143.
16. Undoubtedly, there were other factors that also led Delaware and New Jersey
to be so enthusiastic for the Constitution, most prominently their equal suffrage in the
Senate. For an introduction to ratification in these states, see Gaspare J. Saladino,
Delaware: Independence and the Concept of a Commercial Republic, in RATIFYING THE
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Pennsylvania and Maryland contained active and vocal AntiFederalists, but ratifying conventions in both of these states also
adopted the Constitution by decisive margins: two-to-one (46-23)
in Pennsylvania and more than five-to-one (63-11) in Maryland.
More significantly, all four of these Mid-Atlantic state ratifying
conventions adopted the Constitution without proposing
amendments. In particular, none of these conventions called for
Congress to amend the Constitution by adding a reserved powers
clause to the document that would limit the United States to
“expressly delegated” powers and reserve all other powers to the
states.
Consider now what happened in the First Congress. When
the future Tenth Amendment was taken up and debated in 1789,
an event Gienapp recounts in Chapter Four (pp. 193-195), these
four states voted as a solid block against the proposal to add the
word “expressly” to the language of that amendment. The only
recorded vote in the House of Representatives on this motion was
17 in favor, 32 against.17 Representatives from the four MidAtlantic states supplied half of these negative votes (16 of 32), as
compared with only one vote in favor of the motion.
Connecticut—another staunchly Federalist state whose
convention ratified the Constitution quickly, decisively, and
without amendments—also lined up strongly in favor of
preserving the implied national powers vested by the
Constitution. Four of the five Connecticut delegates, including
Sherman, voted against the motion, and the fifth did not vote. All
told, then, delegates from the five most strongly Federalist states
at the time, all of which had ratified the Constitution without
proposing amendments, voted against this “second bite at the
apple” to circumscribe implied powers by an astonishing ratio of
20-to-1. By contrast, the other six delegations then sitting in
Congress—New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia,
South Carolina, and Georgia—voted in favor of the motion to add
“expressly” to the future Tenth Amendment by a 4-3 ratio (16
votes in favor, 12 against).Except for Georgia, conventions in all
of these states had voted in favor of amendments specifically
designed to curtail implied government powers.
A similar pattern can be gleaned from the controversy over
CONSTITUTION 29-51 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989); Sarah M.
Shumer, New Jersey: Property and the Price of Republican Politics, in id., 71-89.
17. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 768 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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the removal power, which Gienapp discusses in Chapter Three
(pp. 125-163). The final vote in the House of Representatives on
the bill to establish the Department of Foreign Affairs, which
indirectly affirmed a doctrine of implied powers, was 29 in favor,
22 against. Almost half of the positive votes for the bill (14/29)
were cast by members from the four Mid-Atlantic states, who
collectively supported the measure by a 14-2 margin. By contrast,
delegates from the seven remaining states voted against the bill
by another 4-3 ratio (20 votes against the bill, 15 in favor).18
Thanks to Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay’s Diary, we also
have a record of how the Department of Foreign Affairs bill fared
in the Senate. Predictably, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey,
and Maryland formed a solid wall of support for the bill and its
affirmation of implied powers, voting in favor of the bill, 7-1 (the
only dissenting voice being Maclay himself). By contrast, the four
Senators from South Carolina and Georgia (Butler, Izard, Few,
and Gunn) voted against the bill, as did both Senators from
Virginia (Grayson and Lee). Finally, the six New England
Senators were divided, 3-3.19
Consider finally the contest over the Bank of the United
States, which Gienapp vividly describes in Chapter Five (pp. 202247). Arguably the most important point to comprehend about
this famous controversy is that the final vote on the bank bill in
the House (39-20) was lopsided and almost entirely sectional. In
the eight northern states (which included Delaware at the time),
the vote in favor of the bill was 34-1. Once again, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and New Jersey led the way, voting unanimously in
favor of the bill; but, in this case, so did the delegations from New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York. The lone
northern holdout was Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts, a
consistent Anti-Federalist, who also voted against the final bill to
establish the Department of Foreign Affairs and in favor of
adding “expressly” to the future Tenth Amendment. By contrast,
19 of the 20 votes against the bank bill were cast by delegates from
the five southern states. Led by Madison, the Virginia delegation
18. See 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 95
(Linda Grant Depauw, Charlene Bangs Bickford & LaVonne Siegal Hauptman eds.,
1977).
19. See THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE
DEBATES 109-116 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit, eds., 1988). As Gienapp notes
(127), the resulting 10-10 tie in the Senate was broken in favor of the bill by Vice-President
John Adams.
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was unanimously opposed to the bank, as was the Georgia
delegation. Four of the South Carolina members and three of the
North Carolina members also voted against the bill. Notably,
Maryland supplied two of the only five southern votes in favor of
the bill, including Joshua Seney, a consistent supporter of implied
powers, who also voted in favor of the bill to establish the
Department of Foreign Affairs and against adding “expressly” to
the future Tenth Amendment.20
What lessons should one draw from these observations? I
suggest that when one looks closely at the three constitutional
controversies Gienapp recounts in Chapters 3–5 of The Second
Creation, a striking pattern emerges, one that is less variable or
fluctuating than one migpht be led to conclude after reading these
chapters and the book as a whole. A large group of delegates,
representing primarily, but not exclusively, the four Mid-Atlantic
states, formed a relatively stable “implied powers faction” in the
First Congress. This faction voted in favor of the final bill to
establish the Department of Foreign Affairs, against adding
“expressly” to the future Tenth Amendment, and in favor of the
bank bill. Twenty-one of the 59 members of the House who were
seated in 1789 fall under this general description, two-thirds of
whom (14/21) represented Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey,
or Maryland. Other core members of this highly nationalist group
included such implied powers stalwarts as Fisher Ames, Benjamin
Goodhue, and Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts; Jonathan
Trumbull of Connecticut; and Egbert Benson, John Laurance,
and Peter Sylvester of New York.
On the other side of the divide, a second group of delegates,
representing primarily, but not exclusively, Virginia and the Deep
South, formed what might be called an “enumerated powers
faction” in the First Congress. With only a few exceptions, this
faction voted in direct opposition to the implied powers group.
Fifteen members of this enumerated powers faction, all but two
of whom represented states that had adopted the Constitution
with proposed amendments limiting implied powers, voted
against the bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs
and in favor of adding “expressly” to the future Tenth
Amendment. When it came to the bank, six of the seven northern
members of this faction defected, but those who remained were
20.

See generally 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 1960.
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joined by an even larger influx of southern delegates, resulting in
the sharply divided sectional vote to which I referred.
Why did 19 of 20 votes against the bank come from below the
Mason-Dixon Line? Why did Madison’s proposed amendments
include a new preamble and four new references to private
property rights? And why did representatives from South
Carolina and Georgia, whose conventions had adopted the
Constitution by overwhelming margins, and whose political
leadership was generally “Federalist” at the time, almost
invariably support efforts to curtail or eliminate implied powers
in the First Congress, whether the topic was removal,
amendments, or the bank? The likely answer to all these
questions—and others like them—involves slavery, a topic to
which Gienapp devotes surprisingly little attention in The Second
Creation. Although William Loughton Smith often takes center
stage in Gienapp’s narrative, for example, there is only a passing
reference to the revealing August 1789 letter Smith sent to
Edward Rutledge, explaining that his position on removal and
amendments grew out of his concerns over slavery.21 Nor, more
importantly, does Gienapp focus attention on the explosive 1790
antislavery petitions, which also generated interesting debates
over the scope of implied federal powers, in which the two
congressional factions I have identified again played leading
roles.22
21. Eight days before another South Carolina delegate, Thomas Tudor Tucker,
moved to add “expressly” to the future Tenth Amendment, Smith informed Rutledge that
his concerns about federal interference with slavery lay at the root of his attitude to
removal and amendments:
I shall support the Amendmts. proposed to the Constitution that any exception to the
powers of Congress shall not be so construed as to give it any powers not expressly
given, & the enumeration of certain rights shall not be so construed as to deny others
retained by the people—& the powers not delegated by the Constn. nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively; if these amendts. are
adopted, they will go a great way in preventing Congress from interfering with our
negroes after 20 years or prohibiting the importation of them. Otherwise, they may
even within the 20 years by a strained construction of some power embarrass us very
much. I had this in contemplation not a little, in my opposition to the Legislature’s
giving judicial constructions on the Constitution.
William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (August 10, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 273 (emphasis original).
22. For instructive accounts of the 1790 antislavery petitions and their fate in
Congress, see, for example, JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE
REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 81-119 (2000); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A
SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 191-203 (2010); Howard A. Ohline, Slavery, Economics, and Congressional
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This seems to me to be the book’s biggest shortcoming, or at
least a missed opportunity. In light of the enormously high stakes,
implicating approximately 30 percent of all Southern wealth,23 the
effort to fix or “liquidate” implied powers over domestic slavery
and thereby establish a “federal consensus” on that subject was
arguably the main event—and one of Madison’s primary
objectives—all along.24 The story Gienapp tells in The Second
Creation is already so rich, stimulating, and well-crafted that it
seems unfair to criticize him for not adding yet another chapter to
the mix, or for not combining his focus on language with a more
interest-based perspective, such as the one I have sketched here.
Every scholar has to make choices, after all, and carefully working
through Madison’s complicated rhetoric and actual beliefs about
slavery, let alone those of other important founders, in light of the
various economic and ideological interests at stake seems like a
daunting task.
This “missing” chapter on slavery—and others, too, involving
assumption, the neutrality controversy, state suability, and
more—is nevertheless an important reminder that Gienapp’s
exciting project of “Reimagining the Creation of the American
Constitution” (p. 1) is a collective, generative, and ongoing
process in which many scholars can profitably engage. We are in
Gienapp’s debt for helping to revitalize this topic, showing us how
it can be pursued with great skill and sensitivity, and pointing the
way forward. This outstanding book has undoubtedly changed the
landscape, and everyone interested in the ideological origins of
American constitutional law would benefit from engaging with it.

Politics, 1790, 46 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 335 (1980).
23. See VAN CLEVE, supra note 22, at 203.
24. For the origin of the term “federal consensus,” which is now standard in the
literature on antislavery constitutionalism, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 15-16 (1977). For more
recent interpretive accounts of this concept, see, e.g., JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM
NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1865, at 2-8
(2013); SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE
NATION’S FOUNDING 162-63 (2018).

